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This paper reviews the history of successes and failures in international
monetary and ﬁnancial reform in two eras of globalization, the late nine-
teenth century and the late twentieth century, and in the period in between.
That history is rich, varied, and diﬃcult to summarize compactly. We there-
fore organize our narrative around a speciﬁc hypothesis.
That hypothesis is that a consensus on the need for monetary and ﬁnan-
cial reform is likely to develop when such reform is seen as essential for the
defense of the global trading system. Typically the international monetary
and ﬁnancial system evolves in a gradual and decentralized manner in re-
sponse to market forces. The shift toward greater exchange rate ﬂexibility
and capital account convertibility since 1973 is the most recent and there-
fore obvious illustration of what is a more general point. Large-scale and
discontinuous reform at a more centralized level—that is, reforms agreed to
and implemented by groups of governments—tend to occur only when
problems in the monetary and ﬁnancial system are seen as placing the
global trading system at risk. Throughout the period we consider, there has
existed a deep and abiding faith in the advantages of trade for economic
growth, the principal exception being the unusual circumstances of the
1930s, when trade and prosperity came to be seen as at odds. Consequently,
priority has been attached to reform in precisely those periods when mon-
etary and ﬁnancial problems are perceived as posing a threat to the global
trading system and hence to growth and prosperity generally. In contrast,
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We thank Michael Bordo and Peter Kenen for helpful comments.there has never existed a comparable consensus on the beneﬁts of open in-
ternational capital markets for stability, eﬃciency, and growth.1 It follows
that disruptions to capital markets that do not also threaten the trading sys-
tem have had less of a tendency to catalyze reform. We test this hypothesis
by confronting it with evidence from major attempts—successful and un-
successful—to reform the international monetary system.
Changes in the balance of opinion regarding the operation of capital
markets also help to explain the form that successive reform eﬀorts have
taken. In the nineteenth century, capital markets were viewed as benign.
The role of governments was limited to providing a framework for their op-
eration; the principal constituents of that framework were the gold stan-
dard, which provided stable exchange rates, and the national central bank,
which provided a uniform and elastic currency. International economic pol-
icy, such as it was, was limited to supporting this regime in times of crisis.
When, in response to policy inconsistencies between countries, capital
markets malfunctioned in the 1930s, controls were slapped on their opera-
tion. Financial markets were suppressed, and banks became the agents of
governments’ industrial policies. The role of policy became to supersede
rather than to support the markets. Mostly policy was formulated solely
with regard to a national context. After 1945, when internationalism re-
vived, policy at the international level largely meant coordinating the ﬁnan-
cial restrictions imposed by governments and in addition supplying the in-
ternational ﬁnancial services that immobilized markets could not.
As memories of the Great Depression faded and the ineﬃciencies of ﬁ-
nancial repression became evident, the notion that the allocation of ﬁnan-
cial resources was a task for the market, familiar from the nineteenth
century, enjoyed a rebirth. The task for policy again came to be seen as
providing a framework within which markets could operate. But how to do
so was controversial. Whether the eﬀorts of national governments and mul-
tilateral institutions (the International Monetary Fund [IMF] in particular)
to structure and stabilize the operation of international ﬁnancial markets
have helped by diminishing the incidence and severity of crises or hurt by
aggravating moral hazard thus became the topic of the day.
The result has been a wide-ranging debate over how to reform the IMF,
the Group of Seven (G7) and the “international ﬁnancial architecture” gen-
erally.2As we read it, the key conclusions of this debate are the need to limit
the frequency and magnitude of IMF rescue loans in order to contain moral
hazard, and the need to encourage adherence to international standards for
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1. However, the oﬃcial community may have come near to such a consensus on the eve of
the 1997 Asia crisis, when there appeared to be general agreement on the need to add a code
for capital market liberalization to the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, a decision from which it
revealingly stepped back subsequently.
2. Williamson (2000) and Goldstein (2001) provide two overviews of the key contributions
to this debate.sound ﬁnancial practice as a way of stabilizing and strengthening ﬁnancial
markets. An historical perspective suggests that these foci are logical con-
sequences of the move back to a more market-based ﬁnancial system; they
reﬂect the world economy’s return to a more nineteenth-century-style in-
ternational ﬁnancial system following an extended rupture. That nine-
teenth-century system featured limited lender-of-last-resort-type facilities
at the domestic and international levels. In addition, international stan-
dards—speciﬁcally, the international gold standard—provided the basis
for organizing the operation of nineteenth-century ﬁnancial markets. Not
coincidentally, the focus of the current debate on the role of oﬃcial lending
and international standards in structuring and stabilizing the operation of
international ﬁnancial markets has a pervasive “back-to-the-future” ﬂavor
about it.
11.1 The Nineteenth Century
The ﬁrst notable nineteenth-century attempt to reform the international
monetary and ﬁnancial system was in 1867 at a conference in Paris called
by Emperor Napoleon III. There was substantial agreement about the de-
sirability of a common monetary standard. Some of the participants went
a step further, advocating standardized coinage.
Two aspects of this initiative are worth emphasizing. First, the impulse to
coordinate monetary arrangements reﬂected not threats to ﬁnancial stabil-
ity but rather the desire for monetary standardization as a way of promot-
ing international trade, which was uniformly regarded as a high priority.
Second, the call for monetary standardization was a manifestation of the
broader desire for economic standardization in an era when technology and
policy were drawing national economies more closely together. Trade ex-
panded enormously following France and Britain’s negotiation of the Cob-
den-Chevalier Treaty in 1860 and its extension to other countries. The rail-
way and the telegraph had already begun to link national markets more
tightly (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999). As a result, the 1860s and 1870s
were marked by an unprecedented drive for international standards and
harmonized regulation. An International Postal Congress met in Paris in
1863, and an International Statistical Congress convened in Berlin later
that same year. The First Geneva Convention on the Treatment of
Wounded Soldiers was signed and the International Committee of the Red
Cross established in 1864. In 1868 Heinrich von Stephan launched an ini-
tiative for an International Postal Union, and the Mannheim Rhine Ship-
ping Agreement made possible large-scale navigation on Europe’s largest
inland waterway. Standardization was all the rage.
Money was an obvious area where standardization promised major ben-
eﬁts. In 1866 the U.S. Congressional Coinage Committee concluded that
“The only interest of any nation that could possibly be injuriously aﬀected
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interest which contributes little to the public welfare” (Russell 1898, 35). At
the end of the Paris conference, the diplomat in charge of the Emperor’s cur-
rency program, de Parieu, concluded that the meeting had laid “siege to the
citadel of monetary diversity, the fall of which you would like to behold, or,
at least, to gradually destroy its walls, for the beneﬁt of the daily increasing
commerce and exchanges of every description among the diﬀerent mem-
bers of the human family” (U.S. Senate 1879, 875–70).
There was, however, less agreement on the monetary arrangement
around which this standardization should take place. Whereas Great
Britain was wedded to the gold standard, France was committed to bimet-
allism. There was little urgency to the proceedings apart from the Emperor’s
search for a bolster to his waning prestige. There was no sense of crisis:
Trade was growing, monetary harmonization or not. The outcome of the
deliberations was thus some additional sentiment in favor of gold-based
currencies but no speciﬁc plan (Einaudi 2000).3
There being no pressing need for action, the international monetary and
ﬁnancial system evolved on the basis not of intergovernmental negotiations
but of its own momentum.4That the leading economic and ﬁnancial power,
Great Britain, had adopted the gold standard encouraged other countries
to do the same in order to be able to better access British markets. By join-
ing the gold standard, countries were better able to borrow abroad (Bordo
and Flandreau, chap. 9 in this volume), which in this period primarily
meant borrowing from Britain, while going onto the gold standard lent ad-
ditional stimulus to trade with other gold-standard countries (Lopez-
Cordoba and Meissner 2000). Thus, market forces more than negotiations
among governments provided the impetus for monetary standardization. It
did not go unnoticed that the ﬁrst country to experience an industrial revo-
lution had also been ﬁrst to adopt the gold standard. On the European con-
tinent, the desire to emulate the ﬁrst industrial nation thus provided addi-
tional motivation for joining the gold standard club. Once Germany went
onto the gold standard, the attractions for other countries were height-
ened.5 The United States chose gold rather than bimetallism in 1873 and
1879 as a way of restoring credibility in the disordered postbellum circum-
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3. Subsequent conferences were no more successful (Reti 1998). Agreement even on coop-
eration limited to the standardization and intercirculation of coinage was limited to cases like
the members of the Scandinavian Union, who had already developed unusually close ties over
a number of years.
4. This is the theme of Gallarotti (1995).
5. Germany emerged from Franco-Prussian War as Great Britain’s leading industrial rival,
was ﬂush with reparations, and derived no trading advantages from the use of silver currency
as the result of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires’ reliance on inconvertible paper.
For all these reasons it found going over to gold attractive, which made it attractive for other
countries to follow. The importance of these network eﬀects is a theme of Eichengreen (1996).
See Meissner (2000) for evidence.stances. With the three major industrial countries on gold, a new world or-
der was born.
The other element of the prewar institutional framework was the na-
tional central bank. It was precisely in the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury that central banks developed their distinctive proﬁles and responsibil-
ities, ﬁrst as bankers to the government and then as stewards of the ﬁnancial
system. This was when Walter Bagehot articulated their role as lenders of
last resort and speciﬁed rules for the extension of those services. The new
central banks—in particular the German Reichsbank and the U.S. Federal
Reserve System—were also intended to deal with internationally transmit-
ted developments. The development of this institutional capacity can again
be interpreted as a functionalist response to industrialization and ﬁnancial
deepening.
The stability of this regime should not be overstated. Banking crises and
forced suspensions of convertibility were recurrent problems, as attested to
by the vast literature on the subject. Bordo et al. (2001) show that, com-
pared to today, banking and currency crises were only slightly less frequent,
and their impact on output was every bit as severe. But no ambitious inter-
national reforms were tabled to address these problems.
There is some controversy about the cooperative management of this in-
ternational system. Eichengreen (1992) argues that support operations by
the Bank of France, the Bank of England, the State Bank of Russia, and
other central banks and governments, while sporadic and ad hoc, were crit-
ical for regime maintenance when the stability of the system was under
threat. Flandreau (1997) and Mouré (2002) have argued that this overstates
the extent of cooperation prior to the Great War. Central bank coopera-
tion—whether frequent or not, whether critical or not—was, however, in-
creasingly recognized as a way of contending with threats to stability. It fol-
lows that, when it came time to reconstruct the international monetary and
ﬁnancial system after the Great War, discussions centered on the scope for
regularizing and institutionalizing the practice.
11.2 From World War I to the Great Depression
The ﬁrst reform eﬀorts of the interwar years were at international con-
ferences in Brussels in 1920 and Genoa in 1922. The overarching goal of
these meetings was the “reconstruction of Europe,” but the most pressing
political-economic issues, reparations and war debts, could not be touched.
The worst threat came from countries that experienced exchange rate de-
preciation and noticed beneﬁts for exports and, more important politically,
for employment. Many of the war-devastated European countries in this
way came more or less openly to regard inﬂation and competitive devalua-
tion as devices for securing employment and political stabilization. Their
“exchange dumping” was not happily received abroad. The United King-
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islation, of which the culmination came with the U.S. Fordner-McCumber
Tariﬀ Act of 1922.
For a country such as Great Britain, which had been at the center of the
prewar trading system, this was devastating. Consequently, the leading
British ﬁgure at Genoa, the charismatic wartime prime minister David
Lloyd George, made the trade motivation for currency agreements the cen-
ter of the British strategy. As Lloyd George explained to parliament before
leaving for Genoa, “The machinery of commerce, on whose sweet and
steady working England depends more than any country in the world, has
been shattered....  A t  the beginning of 1922 England’s international trade
was about ﬁfty percent of its pre-war ﬁgure. Two million of her artisans
were workless and wageless, and dependent on a vast and ruinous provision
of outdoor relief.” On his return from the conference, the prime minister ex-
plained further: “If Genoa were to fail, the condition of Europe would in-
deed be tragic. The channels of international trade would become hope-
lessly clogged by restrictions and diﬃculties, artiﬁcial and otherwise.
Countries would stagnate in the poisonous national swamps of insolvency.
There would be quarrels, suspicions and feuds between nations, ending in
who knows what great conﬂict” (Mills 1922, 11, 313).
Although the recommendations of the Genoa experts included measures
to simplify customs procedures and reduce transport costs, their main
thrust was monetary—they were directed at stopping currency deprecia-
tion. They recommended the restoration of gold convertibility, the creation
of independent central banks, ﬁscal discipline, ﬁnancial assistance for
weak-currency countries, and cooperative central bank management. It
will be evident from our description of the prewar system that none of these
elements was entirely new. Gold convertibility and an independent central
bank to reconcile its maintenance with the ﬂuctuating ﬁnancial needs of in-
dustry and trade (by providing “an elastic currency,” in the phrase that fea-
tured in discussions of the establishment of the Federal Reserve System)
had been centerpieces of the prewar system, and there was agreement at
Brussels and Genoa on the desirability of putting them back in place.6
Regime-preserving cooperation had already brought several of those banks
of issue into closer, more regular contact. Even the form of that coopera-
tion, assistance for countries with ﬁnancial problems, suggested a mecha-
nism through which the incentives to rejoin the international system might
now be sharpened.
In all these respects, then, the appropriate metaphor for the development
of the international monetary and ﬁnancial system was evolution rather
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6. About the gold standard there was no question. And, as the delegates to the Brussels Con-
ference concluded, “Banks and especially Banks of Issue should be free from political pressure
and should be conducted only on lines of prudent ﬁnance” (Bank of England, OC50/6, 13 De-
cember, 1933, per Jacobsson, “Notes on a Conversation with Sir Otto Niemeyer”).than revolution. Absent threats to the global trading system and hence to
growth and recovery, neither Brussels nor Genoa generated reform propos-
als that departed signiﬁcantly from the prewar status quo.
The consequences were mixed. Genoa was a successful negotiation to the
limited extent that it produced a workable short-term solution to the prob-
lems of the postwar international monetary system, but it did nothing to ad-
dress the underlying weaknesses of the gold-exchange standard, something
that became painfully evident once the Great Depression struck. At a more
fundamental level, it failed to achieve policymakers’ goal of rebuilding the
international trading system.
Genoa was basically a monetary agreement, although discussions
touched on a number of other issues. The international standard to which
parties to the Genoa Agreement were held was the international gold stan-
dard. But at Genoa we also see a ﬁrst hint of a trend that would become in-
creasingly evident as the century progressed: that full participation in the
international system, and in particular the ability to derive the full beneﬁts
of open, multilateral trade, required adherence to standards for policy and
behavior beyond the strictly monetary. This tendency manifested itself at
Genoa in the recognition that ﬁscal policy was a matter of common con-
cern. All countries that participated actively in the international system, the
delegates agreed, should strive for balanced budgets and ﬁscal trans-
parency. Fiscal discipline had acquired prominence when the budgets of the
countries that had been engaged in World War I fell into deﬁcit and post-
war societies, confronting a changed balance of political pressures, found it
impossible to produce the consensus needed to restore ﬁscal balance. As hy-
perinﬂation in Central and Eastern Europe revealed, chronic budget
deﬁcits could wreak havoc with ﬁnancial stability, exchange rate stability,
and the reconstruction of international trade. As a result of these political
changes, monetary and ﬁnancial stability, and the reconstruction of inter-
national trade, now required more than simply adoption of a particular
monetary standard. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁscal prerequisites for the mainte-
nance of that monetary standard also had to be met.
Unfortunately, the parties to this agreement lacked a mechanism for en-
couraging adherence to this standard. Conditional ﬁnancial assistance was
a potential carrot, but not all countries sought or obtained such assistance,
although a limited number of stabilization loans were extended through the
League of Nations, notably in the cases of Austria and Hungary, and by na-
tional governments (Santaella 1992). Just as IMF conditionality cannot
aﬀect behavior when countries are reluctant to come to the IMF, ﬁscal dis-
cipline could not be required as a condition of oﬃcial assistance in the
1920s when oﬃcial assistance was provided only sporadically.
The major drawback of the League system was that there existed no mul-
tilateral organization with the requisite capacity, absent U.S. membership.
The establishment of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) can be
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bank” (as contemporaries referred to the BIS) originated in the eﬀort to
use technocratic means to solve the postwar dispute over reparations and
interallied debt payments that pitted Germany against France, France
against Great Britain and the United States, and Great Britain against the
United States, and to prevent that dispute from derailing eﬀorts to recon-
struct the international trading system.7 But the BIS was intended as more
than a reparations bank; its founders saw it as a way of providing technical
solutions to economic problems, of cultivating cooperation among central
banks, and ultimately of stabilizing the world trading system.8
The constitution of the BIS reﬂected the political circumstances in which
it had been established.9 All of South and Central America, Africa, Great
Britain’s overseas dominions, and Asia were excluded, with the exception of
Japan, which owed its inclusion to its status as a reparations creditor.10
While Spain was left out, the United States was brought in, although its rep-
resentation was unoﬃcial because the Federal Reserve System was forbid-
den to participate.11
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7. In 1929, a new reparations scheme, the Young Plan, was adopted at the Paris Experts’
Conference. Previously, under the Dawes Plan, the agent-general had been responsible for con-
verting the marks paid by the German government into foreign currency and judging whether
the foreign exchange market would allow such a large transaction. Now, Germany was to in-
stead pay her reparation marks to a new institution, the BIS, which replaced the transfer pro-
tection mechanism of the Dawes Plan. Whereas the agent general had possessed the discre-
tionary power to reinvest reparation payments in German securities and thus to limit the
pressure on the exchange rate, now the transfer would be automatic, but the national central
bankers who comprised the new institution’s board would collaborate in oﬀsetting any adverse
consequences for the foreign exchange market. The bank also acted as the ﬁscal agent for the
Dawes and Young loans, as well as other international loans.
8. Sir Charles Addis, a member of the committee established at the 1929 Hague Conference
to design the new bank, wrote: “It was hoped by this plan to fulﬁll the dream of Genoa by the
gradual development of the BIS into a cooperative society of Central Banks” (Bank of En-
gland, G1/1, 28 July 1929, Addis to Leith-Ross [British Treasury]). Others described the object
of the BIS as collaboration to “evolve a common body of monetary doctrine” and to “smooth
out the business cycle, and to contribute toward a greater equilibrium in the general level of
economic activity” (Fifth Annual Report, also quoted in Eichengreen 1992, 263).
9. Disputes among the Paris experts, at the Hague conferences, and within the Organization
Committee left the BIS “vague, obscure, badly arranged and sometimes inconsistent,” in the
words of one of its directors. (Bank of England, G1/1, Otto Niemeyer memorandum).
10. One is reminded of the fact that fully a third of the executive directors on today’s IMF
board are European, while only two out of twenty-four are African, reﬂecting political imper-
atives when this successor to the BIS was created in 1944.
11. Reﬂecting the risk of involving the United States oﬃcially in the reparations quagmire.
As a consequence, the BIS held its dollar deposits at two leading private New York banks.
Moreover, the bank was not situated in a major ﬁnancial center: The choice of site initially lay
between the small countries of Europe, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, with
France advocating a Belgian location and Great Britain and Germany militantly opposed. In
Switzerland, the eventual choice, Zürich, was rejected because, although a major ﬁnancial cen-
ter, it was too German; Geneva implied too much of an entanglement with the League of Na-
tions; and thus the choice fell on Basel. Staﬃng followed the principal of national representa-
tion. The ﬁrst president, Gates McGarrah, was an American, but the general manager in
charge of operations was a young Banque de France oﬃcial, Pierre Quesnay. Protests fromIt was diﬃcult after the deliberations of the organization committee to
avoid the conclusion drawn by a later British director of the Bank, Sir Otto
Niemeyer, that “No one who started out to construct a Super Bank for
world cooperative purposes could conceivably have hit on the constitution
proposed for the BIS.”12 The BIS was not permitted to make medium- or
long-term investments (outside Germany) that might have been useful for
stabilization purposes. Its capital was a mere 500 million gold francs suisses,
subscribed by central banks or (in the case of Japan and the United States)
banking groups.13 It had only 1,800 million Swiss francs in deposits, of
which SF 300 million were reinvested in Germany, SF 650 million were
short-term deposits by reparations creditors that had not yet transferred
their annuities, and SF 800 million represented other central bank deposits.
These resources were already exhausted by August 1930, three months af-
ter the bank opened for business.14
The BIS was then confronted by a world ﬁnancial crisis of unimagined
proportions. Should it provide emergency credits to central banks? This
seemed logical, given that the BIS was a central banker’s bank, but French
objections to a proposed Austro-German customs union and to German
rearmament, both of which were prohibited under the Versailles Treaty,
blocked the Bank from providing early and generous assistance in response
to requests for Germany and Austria. Should it attempt new forms of lend-
ing? The need arose out of the world depression and ﬁnancial crisis immo-
bilizing bank loans, including loans and credits from foreign banks denom-
inated not in domestic currency but in dollars and sterling. This was where
an international lender might have done what national central banks, con-
strained by ﬁxed exchange rates and unable to print dollars, could not.
In the autumn of 1930 a BIS subcommittee launched an inquiry into how
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Reichsbank president Hjalmar Schacht that Quesnay had been the ﬁgure responsible for or-
ganizing a speculative attack on the mark in the spring of 1929 were ignored. Quesnay had
powerful claim to his new position: Owen Young, the architect of the new reparations plan,
hailed the thirty-six-year-old economist as the principal author of both the Young Plan and
the Bank. (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, no. 185, 30 January 1930, “Bank für internationalen
Zahlungsausgleich”). Quesnay’s deputy was Ernst Hülse from the Reichsbank, a blinkered and
unimaginative bureaucrat more intent on warding oﬀ invasions of his administrative turf than
on rescuing the international ﬁnancial system (e.g., Bank of England G1/4, 2 November 1931,
Rodd to Siepmann). The result would have been deadlock or a descent into routine and triv-
ial business had Quesnay not possessed rather more imagination and initiative.
12. Bank of England, G1/1, Otto Niemeyer memorandum.
13. See Auboin (1955). This was a mere 0.1 percent of 1930 U.S. gross national product
(GNP), whereas the capital of the IMF was 4.0 percent of U.S. GNP in 1945.
14. Bank of England, G1/2, 12 July 1930, Siepmann memorandum on phone conversation
with Rodd (BIS). One of its staﬀ came to the conclusion that “if things continue to take their
present course, the Bank will be in a completely frozen position within a month and unable to
meet its liabilities without borrowing” (Bank of England, G1/2, 10 August 1930, HAS Note on
telephone conversation with Rodd). The BIS’s sole operation of systematic signiﬁcance in its
ﬁrst year of existence was a stabilization credit of £3 million in April 1931 designed to allow
Spain to return to the gold standard, a goal that the global depression prevented from being
achieved.the Bank might address these problems.15 To  thaw Central European
credit, it recommended that a sum equivalent to the BIS’s capital, plus its
deposits, be placed in medium-term bills bought from banks. A more am-
bitious proposal was tabled in February 1931 by the Bank of England and
became known as the Kindersley (or Norman-Kindersley) scheme. (Mon-
tagu Norman was the inﬂuential governor of the Bank of England, and Sir
Robert Kindersley was a director of both the Bank of England and the
BIS.) This was a response to the collapse of international bond markets, on
which new issues had been rendered impossible by the implosion of secu-
rity prices. Kindersley and Norman recommended the creation of an in-
ternational corporation with a capital of £25–50 million empowered to is-
sue bonds up to three times its capital on behalf of national governments,
municipalities, mortgage banks, harbor boards, railways, and public utility
companies.16
Although their scheme won the support of Germany, where the danger
of ﬁnancial collapse was acute, other countries feared the inﬂationary con-
sequences. The governor of the Banque de France argued that BIS par-
ticipation in the Kindersley scheme would be contrary to the Bank’s
statutes.17 American ﬁnanciers were similarly skeptical. The Bank’s ﬁrst
president, an American, Gates McGarrah, warned the leading New York
bank, J. P. Morgan, that the scheme was impractical and that it would be
better to organize new loans through private banking channels.18 The pro-
posal thus languished. As Norman noted sadly, the BIS was “already slip-
ping to the bottom of a ditch and in that position seems likely to do no
more than helpfully perform a number of routine and Central Banking op-
erations.”19
A more modest but in some ways more interesting idea submitted by the
Belgian banker Emile Francqui to the medium-term credit subcommittee
fared little better. Reﬂecting worries that rescue eﬀorts relying on central
banks and oﬃcial institutions would fail owing to their limited ﬁnancial
and political resources, Francqui proposed to supplement oﬃcial contribu-
tions by catalyzing private-sector lending (to use modern IMF parlance).
The BIS, he proposed, should rediscount up to £10 million of commercial
paper in order to reinvigorate ﬁnancial markets and pave the way for Ivar
Kreuger, the charismatic Swedish speculator and ﬁnancier, to underwrite
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15. Bank of England, OV4/84, 29 October 1930, Quesnay to Siepmann, attaching memo-
randum by Dr. Simon.
16. Bank of England, OV4/34, 2 February 1931, memorandum “Kindersley scheme.”
17. Moreover, where French banks were supposed to subscribe most of the bonds, there was
no readiness to oﬀer them “means of controlling the use of the funds furnished” (27 February
1931, Moret communication to McGarrah).
18. The Morgan bankers agreed. (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 797.3; BIS, 18 March
1931, McGarrah cable for Lamont and Gilbert).
19. 3 March 1931, Norman to Harrison.new issues. But Francqui’s initiative was not well received by the two hostile
camps in the BIS. The British and Germans regarded the idea as inade-
quate, while the French dismissed it as “utopian.”20
In sum, the BIS lacked the ﬁnances and leadership to cope with a crisis
of such enormity. There was no consensus regarding its role and a reluc-
tance on the part of the creditor countries to ﬁnance its operations. Its
shareholders were divided, and no country had the capacity to impose a co-
herent vision. The BIS therefore retreated into the safer world of data dis-
semination. It failed to do anything to prevent a major crisis and was out of
its depth in dealing with the consequences.
11.3 The 1930s
While this attempt to manage the crisis failed, there was still hope that the
international community would draw constructive lessons from it. The ﬁrst
opportunity to demonstrate that it had was the London Conference. A
World Economic Conference had long been suggested by American diplo-
mats as a way of bringing Europe to its senses and as a way of limiting re-
taliation against the Smoot-Hawley tariﬀ. Here, then, we see the role of
threats to the trading system in galvanizing reform. Great Britain took up
the idea in October 1930 and passed it on to Germany. The Germans, for
their part, thought it might open a way to make the United States interested
in the ﬁnancial side of economic questions and in particular in the end of
reparations. The German foreign minister then urged his ambassadors to
sell the plan to the Americans as a potential platform for Hoover’s reelec-
tion campaign.21
As the conference approached, governments realized that a large meeting
would not produce results unless adequate groundwork was laid. The meet-
ings of preliminary commissions and committees that began in late 1932
under the auspices of the League of Nations represented the last major
attempt to deal with the policy questions of the Depression era in an inter-
national framework. Separate monetary and trade subcommittees met to
deﬁne the respective agendas. Unfortunately, each saw the design of its de-
liberations as hinging on its counterpart’s. Speakers at the Financial Sub-
Committee agreed that “freer trade was a prerequisite of a return to normal
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20. Bank of England, OV4/84, 7 May 1931, report of Francqui subcommittee; 22 April 1931,
McGarrah to Norman; 18 May 1931, BIS board meeting. This pessimism was not unjustiﬁed,
since the BIS meeting at which Francqui and Kindersley plans were killed oﬀ took place just a
week after the collapse of the Vienna Creditanstalt. The crisis quickly infected much of the Eu-
ropean continent and moved over to England and the United States. Less than a year after he
was supposed to have organized a scheme that might rescue the international ﬁnancial system,
Ivar Kreuger killed himself in a Paris hotel room.
21. Politisches Archive des Auswartigen Amtes, W21A, 20 December 1930, Hoesch cable;
29 December 1930, Curtius to Hoesch.economic conditions and of a return to the gold standard.”22 In the Eco-
nomic (i.e., trade) Sub-Committee, ﬁnancial normalization was seen as a
precondition for rebuilding trade. No progress was made in breaking this
logjam.
The second attempt at preparation involved politicians rather than tech-
nocrats in April-May 1933. The newly inaugurated U.S. president, Franklin
Roosevelt, oﬀered a tariﬀtruce for the duration of the conference. The debt
issue was widened by the German central bank president’s attempt to win
consent for a German moratorium on servicing long-term private foreign
debt. And the monetary issue was raised in acute form by the announce-
ment of the U.S. gold embargo while British Prime Minister Ramsay Mac-
Donald and his chief ﬁnancial adviser, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, were still
en route to a preliminary meeting in Washington, D.C.
By the time the conference ﬁnally met, on 12 June 1933 at the London
Geological Museum, there were too many parties interested in killing it oﬀ
for there to be much chance of success. The conference resembled nothing
so much as an Agatha Christie novel in which there are too many suspects,
all with plausible motives and dubious alibis. Great Britain’s insistence on
war debt reduction, which it believed to be the original raison d’être of the
conference, meant that it did not want discussions to widen. Chancellor of
the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain stressed that the conference would not
be successful if it did not resolve the war debt issue. But Roosevelt’s in-
structions to the U.S. delegation excluded either formal or informal discus-
sion of war debts as well as disarmament.23
The currency stabilization goals of the conference were fatally under-
mined by President Roosevelt’s “bombshell message” that the United States
had no intention of stabilizing the dollar. The U.S. administration was de-
termined that national stability should have priority over internationalism.
Rebuilding trade was desirable as a way of giving impetus to U.S. exports,
but there was little immediate scope for this in the depressed conditions
of the 1930s, with much of Central Europe having come under German
domination and Latin America having turned to import substitution. Roo-
sevelt’s unilateral monetary initiative was thus a desperate eﬀort to stimu-
late recovery at home regardless of the consequences for the international
monetary and trading systems. By the ﬁfth week, delegates realized that the
position was hopeless. On 27 July, the conference went into recess, and the
free-trading U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull delivered a mournful clos-
ing speech.24
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22. League of Nations, R2672, 1 November 1932, second meeting of monetary subcommit-
tee.
23. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933 I, p. 621.
24. “A reasonable combination of the practicable phases of both economic nationalism and
economic internationalism—avoiding the extremes of each—should be our objective,” he
modestly concluded. In practice, the participants ignored even the tariﬀ truce: Great BritainThe reasons for this failure are not hard to see. The Roosevelt adminis-
tration recognized the desirability of rebuilding world trade but, in the ab-
sence of international cooperation, saw domestic stability and trade recon-
struction as at loggerheads. It saw itself as having no choice but to put this
aspiration on hold until currency depreciation and monetary reﬂation had
succeeded in initiating recovery. In any case, rebuilding world trade was the
last thing that appealed to a Germany intent on expanding its inﬂuence in
Central and Eastern Europe. Support for protectionist measures was also
strong in France, where farmers were now feeling the brunt of the depres-
sion. Thus, proposals for monetary and ﬁnancial stabilization as a way of
rebuilding world trade met with limited support.
11.4 Bretton Woods
From this experience the British economist John Maynard Keynes drew
the conclusion that multilateral negotiations among governments of
roughly comparable inﬂuence could not be expected to succeed and that a
workable plan could only be realized at the insistence of “a single power or
like-minded group of powers” (Skidelsky 1992, 482). Keynes’s insight pro-
vides the obvious explanation for the greater success of the next conference.
Although there were forty-four or forty-ﬁve nations represented at Bretton
Woods (depending on one’s view of the status of the Danish delegation),
only the United States and the United Kingdom played signiﬁcant roles.25
Plans for the IMF and the World Bank had already emerged from earlier
Anglo-American discussions, which the other participants had no choice
but to accept. Although there was negotiation over the Bretton Woods
Agreement, that negotiation was fundamentally bilateral.
Moreover, it was lopsided bilateralism: the United States had a prepon-
derance of power, whereas the United Kingdom was ﬁnancially and eco-
nomically strapped. This imbalance shaped the negotiations, in which
Keynes’s vision (which would have placed much greater obligations to ad-
just on the surplus country or countries) was defeated and the America’s
White Plan was adopted with only minor modiﬁcation.
In addition, there was now more of a consensus regarding the economic
basis of the new world order. Capital ﬂows were destabilizing, competitive
devaluations a threat, discriminatory trade policies a danger.26 Some schol-
ars trace the making of the postwar settlement to the emergence of what
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raised schedules on ﬁfty items, claiming that it had made applications for these before the truce
came into eﬀect on 12 May. In September, the Netherlands and Sweden, and then in Novem-
ber Great Britain, withdrew from the truce. This was the end of the last major attempt at in-
ternational cooperation on trade and ﬁnancial issues.
25. Although it is sometimes claimed that in-between powers, in particular Canada and
France, played a role in brokering between the British and American delegations.
26. And associated with the politically discredited systems of Germany and Japan.they term an “epistemic community” of policy experts who trusted one
other and shared a vision of managed internationalism (Ikenberry 1993).
Intellectual consensus there was, but this does not suﬃce to explain the suc-
cess of Bretton Woods; there had been a similar consensus in the 1920s re-
garding the desirability of returning to the gold standard and of central
bank cooperation. Montagu Norman, Hjalmar Schacht, and Benjamin
Strong had been on terms of great intimacy, in other words; although they
spoke a common intellectual language, and evolved a sort of international
solidarity of central banks, they nonetheless proved incapable of mounting
an institutionalized response to global ﬁnancial problems.
Why, then, when they failed did their successors at Bretton Woods suc-
ceed? To start with, the context for Bretton Woods was diﬀerent. Although
there was no immediate crisis, there was signiﬁcant pressure to produce a
settlement. The conference met just after the Allied landings in Normandy,
which created the possibility of an early end to the European war.27 The
timetable was further tightened by the need to act before the November U.S.
elections.28
Moreover, the participants structured and ordered the Bretton Woods
negotiations by attaching priority to the reconstruction of trade. In the
1920s nationalism had subverted the eﬀorts of internationalists to restore a
free and open trade regime; the new nations of Central and Eastern Europe
depended on tariﬀs for public-sector revenues and for easing the adjust-
ment to their new economic and political circumstances. The tariﬀ truce
conferences convened by the League of Nations consequently elicited little
enthusiasm. In 1933 attitudes toward trade liberalization had been mixed;
whereas some governments attached priority to reconstructing trade, oth-
ers preferred to suppress it.29 What sort of monetary and ﬁnancial order
might be tailored to such a world was unclear. In 1944, in contrast, there
was no doubt about the U.S. commitment to trade liberalization and there-
fore about its preference for a monetary system that mandated exchange
rate stability and current-account convertibility as a way of creating a trade-
friendly ﬁnancial environment.30 U.S. export interests could be enlisted to
push for congressional ratiﬁcation of the Bretton Woods Agreement. And
given America’s preponderance of power, other countries had no choice but
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27. The conference took place before the Allied disaster at Arnhem.
28. As Morgenthau candidly told a strategy meeting preparing for Bretton Woods, “we felt
that it was good for the world, good for the nation, and good for the Democratic Party, for us
to move” (Blum 1967, 248). White was equally insistent that the meetings had to take place be-
fore the American party political conventions (Interdepartmental meetings, 1 April 1944).
29. As noted above, the attitude of the U.S. government was somewhat ambivalent (Cordell
Hull felt much more strongly about liberalization than many of his colleagues), and other
countries, whether they saw protection and discrimination as a means of cultivating self-
suﬃciency (as in Germany) or supporting agriculture (as in France and Italy), were strongly
opposed.
30. Capital account convertibility, being less essential to trade, was a diﬀerent story.to go along. They might push for concessions on the margin, insisting that
pegged exchange rates should also be adjustable, by arguing that there
should be a ﬁve-year transitional period before current account convert-
ibility was required, and by seeking to maximize the ﬁnancial resources of
the IMF and the World Bank. But with memories of trade warfare in the
1930s still fresh, they fundamentally shared the U.S. priority of establishing
a trade-friendly monetary and ﬁnancial environment.
11.5 After Bretton Woods
That this vision took time to be realized reminds us that monetary and ﬁ-
nancial reform is rarely swift. Even in Western Europe, the restoration of
current account convertibility took longer than envisaged, until December
1958.31 Japan accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the IMF agree-
ment on current account convertibility in 1964. Most developing countries
retained current account restrictions until the 1980s and 1990s.
Two stories can be told about the disintegration of Bretton Woods. Ac-
cording to one, the breakdown was a Triﬃnite consequence of a buildup of
claims on the United States that were needed for the liquidity of the system
but could be converted in a panic. According to the other, the breakdown
was a result of U.S. action in response to a worsening trade position, in
which the country’s most aggressive trade partner, Japan, refused to con-
sider any revaluation that might stem the tide of exports. Since foreign com-
petition, and especially the competition of Japanese manufactured goods
(at that time the greatest attention was given to textiles) was a major politi-
cal issue, action by the administration was needed to tackle the trade prob-
lem. The Nixon package of 15 August 1971, which by closing the gold win-
dow (through which gold had been made available at $35 an ounce) ended
the par value system, limited the import surcharge to 10 percent. By this in-
terpretation, a modiﬁcation of the monetary order was needed to prevent a
trade war.
The new system of parities calculated at the Smithsonian in December
1971 held for just over a year. The renewed collapse is best explained in
terms of an expansive U.S. monetary policy leading to larger U.S. trade
deﬁcits and thus to the reemergence of the same problems that had caused
the breakdown of August 1971 in the ﬁrst place. Allowing the international
monetary system to break down was thus seen as the alternative to a vicious
descent into protectionism and trade warfare. Alternatives they were, but
not mutually exclusive ones: As it was, the 1970s witnessed a dramatic ex-
pansion in the “new protectionism” of voluntary export restraints, dubious
Monetary and Financial Reform in Two Eras of Globalization 529
31. It was achieved not so much through the IMF as with the bilateral support of the United
States through the Marshall Plan to the European Payments Union (although the attainment
of convertibility was preceded by a surge of IMF credit in 1956–57).consumer safety standards, and similar devices to circumvent General
Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) rules.
Following the collapse of the par value system, calls were heard for a new
Bretton Woods. But there was never a systematic redesign of international
monetary and ﬁnancial arrangements. The international monetary system
(or “non-system” as it was dubbed by John Williamson) evolved through a
series of patchwork reforms. The agency of this process, the Committee of
Twenty (C20), faced no particular time pressure and broke down in the face
of the 1973–74 oil shock. France and Japan preferred the restoration of ﬁxed
exchange rates but in the context of a system that imposed ﬁrmer constraints
on the United States. German policymakers were divided, British policy-
makers weak and confused. The United States, for its part, did not want the
dollar to be placed again in the impossible position of the 1960s. U.S. Trea-
sury Secretary George Shultz and his undersecretary, Paul Volcker, were pre-
pared to contemplate pegged rates only if the bands around them were wide
and a mechanism was created to force surplus countries to adjust. With lack
of agreement on the latter, they reluctantly concluded that ﬂoating rates were
the only option. And this was not acceptable to America’s C20 partners.
Bilateral discussions between U.S. and French Treasury oﬃcials, rather
than the more multilateral C20 approach, produced the formula that rec-
onciled prevailing institutions with the new reality. Instead of a “system of
stable rates,” countries committed to maintaining a “stable system of
rates.”32 This was a minimalist approach to reform but probably the only
one practicable at the time. It acknowledged the shift by a growing number
of countries toward more ﬂexible exchange rates, which was already a fait
accompli. Beyond that, it committed them to little.
The failure of more radical reforms reﬂected the absence of a consensus
on the direction that they should take. There was no overwhelming threat
to world trade from the increased variability of exchange rates, contrary to
warnings sounded following the collapse of Bretton Woods. In part this re-
ﬂected the large number of small countries that continued to peg their cur-
rencies to that of a larger trading partner. In addition it reﬂected the ample
supply of credit provided by the process of petro-dollar recycling.
Where fears for the continued expansion of trade were greatest was where
trade mattered most: namely, in Europe. In response, Germany and France
devised for themselves a mini–Bretton Woods (the Snake and then the Eu-
ropean Monetary System). Initially, negotiations proceeded on a tripartite
basis, with the United Kingdom (now a member of the European Commu-
nity) playing an active part. This produced few results, but the scheme de-
veloped quickly when only German and French negotiators were involved.
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32. This Franco-American compromise was discussed at the Rambouillet Summit (by the
ﬁve leading Western industrial countries) and institutionalized in the Second Amendment of
the Articles of Agreement, which obliged countries to promote stable exchange rates by fos-
tering orderly economic conditions while empowering the Fund to conduct “ﬁrm surveil-
lance” of those policies.The most active phase of monetary and exchange rate coordination in the
post–Bretton Woods years was the mid-1980s. Again, governments were
prompted to act by threats to the trading system, speciﬁcally the apprecia-
tion of the dollar and the threat of a protectionist response by the U.S. Con-
gress. In the spring of 1985, the Senate unanimously voted a resolution call-
ing for retaliation against Japanese imports, and a bill was then introduced
providing for surcharges on the products of those countries with large sur-
pluses against the United States. The obvious response that might defuse
domestic pressure in the United States without threatening the international
trading system was exchange rate realignment. Formally the venue was the
regular meetings of Group of Five (G5) or G7 ﬁnance ministers (probably
the central locus of ﬁnancial cooperation between the major industrial
countries), although critical momentum was gained in bilateral discussions
between Japan and the United States. The United States had a preponder-
ance of inﬂuence insofar as Japan was vulnerable to U.S. protectionism.
Trade issues lent monetary discussions substantial urgency and made the
Japanese willing to accept a deal. The outcome was agreement by the G5 ﬁ-
nance ministers and central bank governors meeting at the Plaza Hotel in
New York in September 1985 to reduce the value of the dollar in an “or-
derly” way through concerted intervention and, more importantly, the
adoption of stimulative policies by Japan.33 The Plaza Agreement was fol-
lowed in 1987 by a new negotiation at a meeting of the ﬁnance ministers
(now the Group of Six, or G6) at the Louvre, with the aim of stabilizing ex-
change rates and again of stimulating growth in Japan (Funabashi 1998).
None of these discussions tackled what appears in retrospect to be the
most important new development of the post–Bretton Woods years,
namely, the explosive growth of capital ﬂows.34 This oversight was rudely
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33. Though it should be noted that the dollar was already declining on foreign exchange
markets.
34. In the international system as it was emerging in the 1970s, with strong private-sector
lending solving the problem of petro-dollar recycling, it actually looked as if the Bretton
Woods institutions were redundant. The IMF’s attempt to remain at the center of the system
through a new approach to the reserve problem, in which a “substitution account” would re-
place national currencies with SDRs, was never realized. The private sector handled the im-
balances and liquidity problems of the 1970s suﬃciently well that many commentators con-
cluded that the IMF and the World Bank would lead a more and more marginal existence,
catering only to poor countries excluded from the world’s capital markets. We are aware of sim-
ilar arguments made about the diminished role of the multilaterals at the beginning of the
twenty-ﬁrst century and choose our language in order to bring out the parallels. Irving Fried-
man put it then, “because they depend upon full and prompt servicing of their loans for their
ﬁnancial proﬁtability and viability, private banks (in contrast to the Fund and the Bank) un-
derstandably tend to focus their attention upon the best managed countries, and, within these
countries, the best managed ﬁrms in the most advanced sectors of the economy” (Friedman
1977, 119). Another prominent banker, Rimmer de Vries of Morgan Guaranty, in April 1982
described the new private-sector consensus in the following terms: “in recent years Fund and
commercial bank lending have evolved in diﬀerent directions.” They had distinct and separate
spheres of operation, and “thus the Fund must not be viewed as a protective umbrella under
which the international banking community can ﬁnd shelter in times of trouble” (de Vries
1982, 10).brought to the world’s attention in the summer of 1982 by threats of default
by Mexico and Argentina. Dealing with what became the Latin American
debt crisis required new money from oﬃcial as well as private sources. The
most diﬃcult task was to involve the private sector—as had been attempted
in 1931 when the BIS called on Ivar Kreuger. Initially, eﬀorts to do so were
led not by the multilateral institutions but by national central banks, espe-
cially in the major ﬁnancial centers, which promptly and even brutally
pressed commercial banks to put in new funds. The BIS oﬀered bridge
loans while the crisis countries awaited IMF assistance. Although the IMF
eventually came to play a central role, linking its conditionality to bank as-
sistance, the cumbersome structure of its decision making precluded an im-
mediate response of the sort needed in times of crisis.35
This solution removed the threat of default at a time when the money-
center banks were heavily exposed. Thus, 1982 did not join 1873, 1890, or
1931, when crises at the periphery spread to the center. It did less to solve
the problems of the debtor countries. In the end, it was initiatives by private
ﬁnancial institutions to write down nonperforming debt that prompted
U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady to embrace a scheme that would re-
duce rather than pile up debt and enable developing countries to regain
market access.
Given how rapidly the crisis unfolded and the consequent lack of time to
redesign the system, it is not surprising that existing institutions and mech-
anisms (national central banks, the BIS, the IMF) were stretched beyond
their original (some might say proper) purposes. In any case, the climate
was inhospitable for radical redesign. It should be recalled that this was a
time of tension between the major industrial countries over economic and
monetary policy, when the Europeans attacked the United States for what
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt called the “highest interest rates since
Jesus Christ,” and in which many U.S. policymakers (notably Treasury Sec-
retary Donald Regan) had a thinly veiled contempt for any kind of interna-
tionalism.
The ﬁnancial crisis of the early 1980s was a shock to international trade.
The dollar value of world trade only reached its 1980 level again in 1986,
and Western Hemisphere trade again matched its 1980 level only in 1988.
Nevertheless the form of crisis resolution, which obliged Latin American
countries to export in order to service debt, meant that there was little room
for 1930s-style experiments in trade restriction. Ultimately, the global trad-
ing system was not jeopardized. Hence, these events did not prompt funda-
mental monetary and ﬁnancial reform.
The end of the 1980s is as good a point as any at which to take stock of
the situation on the eve of the events that provide the context for current de-
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35. In critical cases, the managing director in fact regularly agreed on measures ahead of for-
mal executive board votes (James 1996, ch. 12).bates. Although much had changed in the course of preceding decades, the
extent of continuity is also striking. International monetary stability and ex-
change rate stability were still regarded as largely synonymous. But ex-
change rate stability was valued less for its own sake than as a way of sup-
porting a stable and expanding network of trade. There was nothing new
about this. It is one way of interpreting the enthusiasm for the International
Monetary Conference of 1867, the Brussels Conference in 1920, and the
Genoa Conference in 1922. The absence of a comparable commitment to
free and open trade explains the failure to agree on an agenda for monetary
reform at the London Conference of 1933. The desire to rebuild the net-
work of international trade, thereby providing foreign markets for U.S. ex-
ports and solidifying intra-European links, was a prime motivation of U.S.
negotiators at Bretton Woods. And the concern of U.S. and Japanese oﬃ-
cials over protectionist threats was a motivation for the Plaza and Louvre
Accords.
11.6 The 1990s
Globalization was the byword of the 1990s, reﬂecting the rapid growth of
international ﬁnancial transactions, the integration of developing countries
into the world economy, and the information and communications revolu-
tion that brought satellite television, the cell phone, and the Internet to re-
mote corners of the world. Capital ﬂows rose exponentially, enabling coun-
tries to ﬁnance their development needs abroad but also applying more
intense pressure—in the form of capital ﬂight—if things went wrong.
Inﬂuencing this market was no easy task. In the debt crisis of the 1980s,
large banks could be counted on to coordinate their smaller counterparts,
and the IMF could simply communicate with the large intermediaries. By
the time of the next debt crisis in 1994–95, the progress of securitization
meant that the investor base was larger and more heterogeneous: It now in-
cluded hedge funds, pension funds, and mutual funds as well as legions of
individual investors. Getting such a large number of creditors to recognize
their collective interest (sometimes even to determine their identity) was no
easy task. This explains the dilemma facing the IMF of how to ameliorate
the severity of a crisis without at the same time bailing out investors (who
may have a collective interest in staying in but an individual interest in get-
ting out) and aggravating moral hazard.
An inadvertent eﬀect of these capital ﬂows was to highlight weaknesses
in domestic ﬁnancial systems. Capital-account liberalization allowed banks
and corporations to fund themselves oﬀshore and currency mismatches to
develop on their balance sheets. It facilitated gambling where corporate
governance was weak, supervision and regulation were underdeveloped,
and the ﬁnancial safety net was unconditional. This environment proved a
fertile seedbed for banking crises. And the same factors limited the capac-
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that re-regulating ﬂows would damage their credibility, to intervene in sta-
bilizing ways. They meant that IMF intervention to contain the conse-
quences might require unprecedented quantities of ﬁnance.
Moreover, just as the recovery of capital mobility in the quarter century
following World War II had undermined the pegged-but-adjustable ex-
change rates of Bretton Woods, the further growth of capital ﬂows now
complicated eﬀorts to operate crawling bands and exchange rate target
zones. If doubts arose about the sustainability of an exchange rate, market
participants could take positions against it. These dynamics played them-
selves out in the series of crises that ricocheted through Europe, Latin
America, and Asia. The result was steady erosion in the share of IMF mem-
ber countries operating soft currency pegs, which were abandoned in favor
of currency boards (and, in Europe, monetary union) on the one hand and
more freely ﬂoating exchange rates on the other.36
This left the IMF in search of an anchor for macroeconomic policy and
a focus for its advice. Should it advocate currency boards and dollarization?
Should it urge its members to ﬂoat their currencies and target inﬂation?
Should it discourage intermediate regimes as crisis prone, or was any ex-
change rate arrangement still viable so long as domestic macroeconomic
policies were brought into conformance with its dictates? Disagreements
over these issues among the Fund’s shareholders, staﬀ, and management
(reﬂecting equally deep divisions in the scholarly literature) prevented the
institution from oﬀering clear and coherent advice, which did not enhance
its credibility in the eyes of the markets or its members (assisting in ex-
change rate management having been the IMF’s original raison d’être and
intellectual bread and butter). Floating rates appeared to many developing-
country governments as presenting too great a risk to domestic ﬁnancial
systems, which might be exposed to a mismatch between liabilities (in dol-
lars or other foreign currencies) and domestic currency assets. Pegging the
exchange rate, adopting a currency board, or dollarizing (in the late-1990s
variant) were still regarded as valid devices where the crisis was extreme, but
there was an understandable reluctance to endorse policies that were tanta-
mount to locking the door and throwing away the key.37
One way of understanding the expanding scope of IMF conditionality is
as a search for new sources of credibility for national policy. The Fund
might condition its assistance on agreement to make the central bank inde-
pendent, to empower the prime minister or the ﬁnance minister to veto the
spending decisions of subcentral governments, or to make budgeting more
transparent, all as ways of enhancing the credibility of policy. These in-
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36. See Fischer (2001) for an overview of these trends.
37. This was the well-known inability to articulate an exit strategy from these rigid mone-
tary-cum-exchange-rate regimes, analyzed in Eichengreen et al. (1998).stances of what the critics of the IMF dismissed as the Fund’s excessively in-
trusive structural conditions were justiﬁed by the institution and its cham-
pions as attempts to enhance credibility by strengthening policy-making in-
stitutions, as opposed to extracting incredible promises of intent.38
None of these justiﬁcations prevented the IMF from being roundly and
widely criticized for its structural interventions (Feldstsein 1998). The
Fund attached more than ﬁfty structural policy conditions to the typical
three-year loan disbursed through its Extended Fund Facility in the 1990s
and nine to ﬁfteen structural conditions to its typical one-year standby
arrangement. Their scale and scope were unlike anything in the institution’s
prior history. The IMF moved into areas like corporate governance, ac-
counting methods and principles, attacks on corruption, and even at times
the desirability of democratization, unprecedented issues for what was a ﬁ-
nancial institution.
Mexico in 1994–95 was the ﬁrst test of this new approach.39The Mexican
crisis was a debt crisis, but it was also a banking crisis, as a result of the bal-
ance sheet mismatches described above, and a conﬁdence crisis, reﬂecting
turmoil in the political system (the Colosio assassination in the run-up to
the presidential election).40 The Fund conditioned its assistance on reform
of the banking system as well as on the standard macroeconomic measures.
Moreover, the scale of the assistance received by Mexico was unprece-
dented, reﬂecting the explosive growth of international ﬁnancial markets
and the need for large amounts of liquidity if default and restructuring were
to be headed oﬀ.
The Fund’s actions were consonant with the preferences of its principal
shareholder. The mid-1990s may have been the peak of U.S. Treasury inﬂu-
ence over the IMF, matched only by the ﬁrst fragile decade of the Fund’s ex-
istence. Europe’s Maastricht-minded countries were busy tending their gar-
dens, and Japan was in the throes of its ﬁnancial crisis. The emerging
markets had only begun asserting themselves. Although it is easy to exag-
gerate the intimacy of the IMF–U.S. Treasury connection, it is hard to oﬀer
another equally convincing explanation for the extraordinary pressure for
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38. In addition, this new emphasis on structural reform is impossible to understand except
in the context of transition in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Transition was the
dominant event of the 1990s. As such, it dominated the IMF’s attention. And it was funda-
mentally a problem of structural transformation. It is hard to imagine approach to multilat-
eral support for this process that would have not emphasized structural reform, in other words,
or focused on privatizing public enterprise, building regulatory institutions, and developing
administrative capacity. This preoccupation shifted the focus of IMF staﬀ and management
from macroeconomic surveillance to a host of new structural policy issues. For better or for
worse (opinions diﬀer), the IMF grew accustomed to attaching structural policy conditions to
its loans and did so whether the recipient was a Latin American reformer or an Asian tiger.
39. The European currency crisis of 1992–93 had been handled internally and involved the
IMF only as an observer.
40. Thus, some authors (Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco 1995) have been led to characterize the
Mexican episode as purely a crisis of investor conﬁdence.capital account liberalization placed on emerging markets by the Fund and
other multilaterals in this period.
The Asian crisis of 1997–98 and its repercussions in Brazil and globally
(with Russia’s default and the all-but-failure of Long-Term Capital Man-
agement) brought these issues to a head. Suﬃce it to say that virtually every
aspect of IMF intervention was called into question.41 Yet there is a para-
dox. At the same time the IMF was so universally excoriated, it came to be
seen as more vital that ever to the operation of the global ﬁnancial system.
The obvious manifestation of this was the increase in the fund’s resources
from 146 billion in special drawing rights (SDR) to SDR 212 billion in the
1998–99 quota review. Until the Asian crisis threatened to become a global
crisis, the review had been stalled because of the reluctance of the U.S. Con-
gress to agree to an increase.42 But once the crisis threatened to reach U.S.
shores, debate quickly gave way to action.
11.7 Reform for the Future
At the same time, there is little consensus on desirable directions for re-
form. In part this reﬂects disagreement and confusion over the nature of re-
cent crises. The events surrounding the devaluation of the Thai baht on 2
July 1997 could be regarded as a conventional crisis of a sort to which the
IMF was accustomed.43 But the consequences, not only for Thailand but
for its neighbors, were unexpectedly severe. Indeed, it was the international
spread of the crisis that was particularly perplexing. Growth rates in other
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41. The fund was criticized for failing to anticipate the crisis, for paying inadequate atten-
tion to the hedge-fund problem, and for inadequately monitoring ﬁnancial markets. It was at-
tacked for creating moral hazard. Its conditionality was impugned on the grounds that the
Asian countries had not entered their crises with monetary and ﬁscal problems (Thailand to
the contrary notwithstanding). Its exchange rate advice was rejected by the champions of cur-
rency boards and collective pegs. Demands that insolvent ﬁnancial intermediaries be closed
and the ﬁnancial system restructured were faulted for damaging conﬁdence in the midst of the
crisis. The fund’s structural conditions were criticized for exceeding the institution’s compe-
tence and as poorly attuned to Asian economies’ distinctive development model. Its delibera-
tions were criticized as opaque and unrepresentative. About the only feature of the institution
that remained free of criticism was the food in the staﬀ cafeteria.
42. Congress was blocking the increase by threatening to attach to the increase in the U.S.
quota demands on IMF conditionality of very dubious relevance to the IMF’s mission (limi-
tations on government funding of family planning, labor, and environmental issues). Its veto
was binding, since members holding over 85 percent of the IMF’s quotas had to agree.
43. The baht was overvalued (Chinn and Dooley 1998). The growth of Thailand’s export
markets (and those of most other Asian countries) had already begun to slow in the second
half of 1995. Real estate and other asset valuations had already declined signiﬁcantly, presag-
ing slower economic growth and problems in the banking system. The current account deﬁcit
had ballooned to 8 percent of GDP, presaging serious problems if investors pulled the plug.
The IMF saw this problem coming and warned the Thai authorities before the fact. And its
program—ﬁnancial assistance to moderate the demand compression required to close the
capital account, conditioned on policy reforms to constrain the rate of growth of domestic
credit—was cut from familiar cloth.Asian countries had slowed at most modestly in 1995–96. No one was warn-
ing of unsustainable external positions. The force with which turbulence hit
the rest of the region thus constituted a surprise. Asia’s plight could not be
dismissed as comeuppance for governments that had run unsustainable
policies fueled by excessive credit expansion and manifested in dangerously
overvalued exchange rates.
In the absence of another diagnosis with clear policy implications, the
IMF instinctively prescribed the standard course of treatment. It recom-
mended narrowing budget deﬁcits, hiking interest rates, and closing insol-
vent ﬁnancial institutions to restore conﬁdence and attract back ﬂight cap-
ital. When these steps failed to calm the markets, the Fund was forced to
acknowledge that they had been ineﬀectual (IMF 1999).
Even with beneﬁt of hindsight, it is not clear what alternative course of
treatment would have been better. Two schools emerged, one that attributed
the crisis to connected lending, excessive reliance on debt ﬁnance, and poor
prudential supervision and regulation, which together undermined the re-
silience of the ﬁnancial system (Goldstein 1998), and another that ascribed
it to investor panic, compounded by the IMF’s insistence on pointing to
structural problems (Radelet and Sachs 1998; Furman and Stiglitz 1998).
With the passage of time there has emerged a synthesis of these views to
which most observers now subscribe. However, the weight attached to the
components continues to diﬀer. U.S. and European oﬃcials, who embrace
the view that the Asian crisis was a product of ﬂawed domestic ﬁnancial sys-
tems and drew the lesson that such problems can put global stability at risk,
have placed at the top of the international agenda measures to upgrade ﬁ-
nancial-market governance and supervision.
The vehicles for doing so are international ﬁnancial codes and standards
for everything from auditing and accounting to bankruptcy, insolvency, and
corporate governance. To be sure, some emerging markets, in Asia in par-
ticular, view these standards as an eﬀort to foist upon them Western modes
of corporate and ﬁnancial governance ill suited to an “Asian model” of high
debt gearing and close public-private collaboration. Low-income countries
fear that they will be denied market access and multilateral assistance if
they are unable to meet the standards of the international community. But
there remains no other coherent approach to strengthening ﬁnancial sys-
tems.44The most diﬃcult task for the multilaterals is to monitor compliance
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44. In principle, it continues in a way that is attuned to the worries of Asian and emerging-
market economies. That the Financial Stability Forum includes a number of emerging
economies, the BIS (whose Committee of Banking Supervisors is responsible for revision of
the Basel international capital standards) has expanded into Asia, and private-sector organi-
zations like the International Accounting Standards Committee include representatives of
emerging markets and have subcommittees dedicated to their problems go some way toward
meeting their objections.and publicize their ﬁndings in a way that strengthens market discipline
without running the risk of precipitating a crisis.45Whether the IMF is suﬃ-
ciently nimble to walk this line remains to be seen.
Group of Seven summiteers, ﬁnance ministers, and the governors of the
IMF drew the further lesson that the Fund must strengthen its surveillance,
of capital markets in particular, in order to better anticipate and avert fu-
ture crises. This is no easy adaptation for staﬀ schooled in the principles of
macroeconomic management but not accounting or corporate governance.
This leaves the Fund no alternative but to access the relevant expertise ex-
ternally.46
Asian governments, including Japan’s, understandably resist the idea that
Asia is a hotbed of “crony capitalism,” preferring the interpretation of the
crisis that blames the overreaction of investors. This has led them to call for
tighter regulation of capital ﬂows, to be achieved by forcing over-the-
counter forward currency transactions into organized exchanges, taking
steps to prevent large traders from manipulating markets, and cracking
down on hedge funds. Unfortunately, it is not clear how these goals can be
achieved short of the reimposition of capital and exchange controls and the
re-regulation of ﬁnancial markets. While the over-the-counter market can
be taxed, it can move oﬀshore.47Hedge funds can be regulated, but they can
disguise their transactions. Hong Kong could intervene in the Hang Seng to
squeeze speculators, but it is not clear that other governments can do so
without casting doubt on their commitment to the market.
The same constraint shapes the debate over the functions of the interna-
tional ﬁnancial institutions. The World Bank has taken on board the cri-
tique that its role should be to subsidize investments in global public goods
like health and environment that, standard economic arguments suggest,
private markets undersupply, now that the growth of private capital markets
has reduced the need for oﬃcial sources of development ﬁnance.48The IMF
has accepted that its members should draw on its facilities mainly in times
of crisis and not borrow for extended periods. There is agreement that mar-
ket-based debt restructuring should be relied on more, ﬁnancial rescues
less. Why is there consensus on these points but not on so many others?
Simply put, these conclusions reﬂect the recognition that the role of inter-
national ﬁnancial cooperation is now conceived, as it was once before, in
the nineteenth century, as supporting rather than superseding the markets.
538 Barry Eichengreen and Harold James
45. The IMF has taken its ﬁrst tentative attempts in this direction by releasing several ex-
perimental Reviews of Standards and Codes (ROSCs).
46. This is the approach being taken to gathering and analyzing the information needed for
the ROSCs that the IMF now proposes to issue for its members, and in the IMF’s and World
Bank’s joint Financial Sector Assessment Programs.
47. From Kuala Lumpur to Singapore, for example.
48. As for whether it will actually curtail its development lending, we will have to see.11.8 Conclusion
In this essay we have characterized the development of the institutions of
international monetary and ﬁnancial cooperation in evolutionary terms.
We have shown that large-scale, comprehensive reform like that which took
place in 1944 is extremely rare; it is the exception to the rule. The 1944 re-
forms were a response to circumstances so unusual (the breakdown of the
international monetary and trade regimes in the 1930s, and the world war)
that they are unlikely to be repeated. The normal process of change is diﬀer-
ent. As with many evolutionary processes, punctuated equilibrium seems
an appropriate metaphor for its pace and character.
What then determines the nature of the equilibrium and the location of
the punctuation marks? We have argued that concerted monetary and ﬁ-
nancial reform is most likely when there is a consensus on the beneﬁts of
free and open trade and when monetary and ﬁnancial problems are seen as
threatening the stability of the global trading system. To take two examples,
at Bretton Woods the desire to construct a free and open trading system,
and the fear that ﬁnancial dislocations placed this goal at risk, helped to set
the stage for monetary and ﬁnancial reform; in the 1930s, in contrast, there
was no comparable consensus regarding the beneﬁts of free and open trade,
and as a result there was no signiﬁcant reform of the international mone-
tary system.
This insight sheds light on the mixed success of recent eﬀorts to strengthen
the international ﬁnancial architecture. The most durable component of the
late-twentieth-century liberal consensus is, once again, the beneﬁts of free
and open trade. The fear that monetary disorder might provoke a protec-
tionist backlash consequently provides powerful impetus for reform at the
regional level, where trade matters most. When in the early 1990s the crisis
in the European Monetary System (EMS) threatened to unleash “competi-
tive devaluations” and jeopardize political support for the single market, Eu-
rope accelerated its forced march to monetary union. And when exchange
rate volatility disrupted Asian trade following the onset of the region’s crisis
in 1997–98, Asian policymakers displayed a surprisingly readiness to con-
template ambitious reform initiatives such as swap arrangements, collective
pegs, and even a regional monetary fund.
Yet the trading system has proven surprisingly resilient to these ﬁnancial
body blows. Notwithstanding the ﬁnancial disruptions of the most recent
decade, trade has continued to expand.49 To argue that far-reaching mone-
tary and ﬁnancial reforms are needed to shield the global trading system
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49. There have been casualties, to be sure, such as the U.S. president’s fast-track authority,
eﬀorts to quickly expand the North American Free Trade Agreement into a free trade area for
the Americas, and a new round of global trade talks. But it is hard to argue that the global trad-
ing system has been seriously placed at risk.from a destructive protectionist backlash would be a stretch. Absent this
threat, it has been diﬃcult to develop a consensus for radical reform of the
international monetary and ﬁnancial system.
To be sure, this is only one of several reasons why nations have not been
able to agree on far-reaching changes in international ﬁnancial institutions
and arrangements. No country today possesses the ﬁnancial power and po-
litical leverage of the United States in 1944. The number of consequential
players in international negotiations is larger than ever before. Their cir-
cumstances and outlooks are more varied. The complexity of negotiations
is correspondingly greater. It follows that a nonnegligible portion of pro-
gress on monetary and ﬁnancial reform has been at the regional level, where
numbers are smaller, outlooks are more uniform, and exceptional institu-
tions or concentrations of power limit transactions costs. Suﬃce it to say
that no monocausal explanation for the success or failure of particular ne-
gotiations (including our own) can be fully adequate. Unfortunately, multi-
factor explanations (like those hinted at in this paper and summarized in
table 11.1) are impossible to test formally, given the small size of the sample.
Still, to the extent that monetary spillovers and ﬁnancial ﬂows are global
and not just regional, there continue to be calls for a global response.
Clearly, there will be no global regulatory agency with the power to override
national ﬁnancial policies because there is no appetite for global govern-
ment.50Rather, the response of the international policy community is to em-
brace international standards as a way of simulating some of the functions
of a global regulator.
This agenda for reforming the international monetary and ﬁnancial sys-
tem is frequently characterized as historically unprecedented—as demand-
ing of countries that wish to participate in international capital markets a
commitment to institutional harmonization unlike anything required of
their predecessors. This is the view of both the champions of the standard-
centered agenda and of its critics, who see it as intrusive, subversive of na-
tional sovereignty, and insensitive to the needs and circumstances of devel-
oping countries. Our review of the historical evidence suggests that the
initiative is in fact neither as novel nor as unprecedented as these interpre-
tations suggest. In the nineteenth century, as now, reform eﬀorts were
centered on international standards designed to stabilize and stimulate
international transactions. The diﬀerence then was that the pressure for
institutional reform and harmonization in the interest of trade expansion
and ﬁnancial stability focused on the monetary standard narrowly deﬁned
(and on the gold standard in particular). After World War II the standard
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50. Although the experience of European Union suggests that there may exist a feasible
halfway house, the reaction again the intrusions of European Union regulation, evident in the
September 2000 Danish referendum and in British political discourse, suggests that resistance
to the construction of institutions of global governance, with signiﬁcant enforcement powers































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eto which countries were held was the Articles of the Agreement of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, which detailed commitments to current ac-
count convertibility and pegged exchange rates. Now the range of monetary
and ﬁnancial standards to which countries are expected to conform is
greater: These include not just IMF codes of conduct for monetary and ﬁs-
cal policies but a lengthy list of international ﬁnancial standards covering
everything from auditing and accounting to bankruptcy and insolvency
procedures, prudential supervision and regulation, and corporate gover-
nance. This is obviously a response to the rapid internationalization of busi-
ness activity. Although the scope of these commitments is unprecedented,
their nature is not: The new approach is a throwback to the nineteenth cen-
tury insofar as the markets rather than the multilaterals are the ultimate ar-
bitrators of countries’ compliance.
What then accounts for what is new and novel, namely, the scope and am-
bition of the agenda? Whereas in the nineteenth century adherence to the
gold standard was regarded as both necessary and suﬃcient for a country
to be active on international ﬁnancial markets, adherence to a particular
monetary standard is now seen as insuﬃcient. The change reﬂects the un-
precedented extent of ﬁnancial integration, reﬂecting technology as well as
policy, which has erased the line between domestic and international ﬁnan-
cial markets and led to the recognition that measures to strengthen and sta-
bilize domestic ﬁnancial markets are prerequisites for international ﬁnan-
cial stability.51 Absent a U-turn away from ﬁnancial integration, which we
think is unlikely, this approach to buttressing ﬁnancial stability, organized
around standards for areas extending well beyond the monetary, is likely to
remain the focus of reform eﬀorts for the foreseeable future.
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Comment Peter B. Kenen
The title of this paper led me to expect that Eichengreen and James would
concentrate on ways in which globalization inﬂuenced the evolution of the
monetary and ﬁnancial system during the last part of the nineteenth cen-
tury and the last part of the twentieth century. In fact, they take on a much
larger task: asking why some reform eﬀorts failed and others succeeded.
They set out their hypothesis right away: “That hypothesis is that a consen-
sus on the need for monetary and ﬁnancial reform is likely to develop when
such reform is seen as essential for the defense of the global trading system.”
In most periods, they say, the monetary and ﬁnancial system evolves in a
gradual manner, largely in response to market forces. Discontinuous re-
form, by contrast, occurs only when problems in the monetary and ﬁnan-
cial system are seen as putting the global trading system at risk. This is, they
say, a result of the fact that, throughout most of the period under study,
there was “deep and abiding faith in the advantages of trade for economic
growth” but no “comparable consensus on the beneﬁts of open interna-
tional capital markets for stability, eﬃciency, and growth.”
This way of interpreting the history of monetary reform has much to
commend it. Reforms do occur discontinuously. So do other forms of inter-
national monetary cooperation. I made the same point several years ago
(Kenen 1989), when I said that the episodic nature of policy coordination
among the major industrial countries calls into question the way that econ-
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Peter B. Kenen is the Walker Professor of Economics and International Finance at Prince-
ton University.omists usually model policy coordination. It can best be viewed, I said, as a
sporadic regime-preserving process, not a continuous policy-optimizing
process. I was therefore pleased to note that Eichengreen and James use the
same phrase to characterize the episodes studied in their paper.
Nevertheless, I have reservations about the strong form of the hypothesis
set out in their paper—one that attaches exclusiveimportance to the preser-
vation of the trading system and little or no intrinsic importance to the
preservation of open capital markets or to the inﬂuence of the monetary
system on the ability of national governments to maintain domestic eco-
nomic stability.
On several occasions, Eichengreen and James demonstrate clearly that
the defense of the trading system was indeed the dominant objective of
some or all of the governments involved in a particular episode. They quote,
for example, the statement by David Lloyd George about the importance of
the Genoa Conference for the preservation of the trading system. Soon
thereafter, however, they appear to contradict him. They say that the Genoa
Conference failed to generate signiﬁcant reforms because the impending re-
turn to the prewar monetary system did not appear to pose a threat to the
trading system.
At times, moreover, Eichengreen and James adopt a somewhat dubious
strategy. They argue, plausibly enough, that failure to reform the monetary
and ﬁnancial system would have done damage to the trading system, and
they therefore conclude that defense of the trading system was the rationale
for the particular reform at issue. Remember, however, the wording of their
own hypothesis. Reform of the monetary and ﬁnancial system occurs when
it “is seen as essential” to defend the trading system. To say that the trading
system might have been harmed in the absence of monetary reform is diﬀer-
ent and less compelling than adducing evidence to show that those involved
in a particular reform eﬀort were fully cognizant of that possibility.
This brings me to my second reservation about the paper. Some reforms
of the monetary and ﬁnancial system have been trade-regime preserving.
The Plaza and Louvre agreements come to mind immediately—although
they should perhaps be viewed as examples of ad hoc cooperation rather
than examples of full-ﬂedged reform. The dollar crisis of 1971 is another
example; although the prevailing exchange rate regime was not seen as a
threat to the trading system, the tactics employed by the United States to
achieve an exchange rate realignment were widely seen as a serious threat to
the trading system.
Consider, however, some other episodes, starting with the Bretton Woods
conference of 1944, which was the most comprehensive reform of the inter-
national monetary system. No one would deny that the attempt to stabilize
exchange rates in the postwar world reﬂected the common belief that the re-
sort to tariﬀs and quotas in the 1930s was due in part to the disintegration
of the monetary system. Furthermore, the Bretton Woods system attached
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trade trumped ﬁnance. But Eichengreen and James pay no attention to the
other important aim of those who designed the Bretton Woods system—
maintaining domestic prosperity in the postwar world. Nor do they pay
enough attention to domestic matters in their account of reform—or its ab-
sence—during the nineteenth century. The failure of the 1867 Paris Con-
ference to produce a meaningful reform of the monetary system was not, I
believe, due mainly to the absence of any grave threat to the trading system.
It appears to have reﬂected lack of agreement about the best way to achieve
domestic monetary stability.
Leaping forward once again, this time to the 1980s, the reforms or ad hoc
arrangements—call them what you will—adopted to cope with the Latin
American debt crisis reﬂected concerns about the vulnerability of the U.S.
banking system. They had very little to do with trade, except in the tauto-
logical sense that, left to themselves, the crisis-stricken countries might have
imposed import controls that would have been marginally disruptive of the
trading system. (The paper notes that trade contracted in the early 1980s
when measured in nominal terms, but that was due to the recession and sub-
sequent stagﬂation in the industrial countries and to the fall in the price of
oil, not to major trade-policy changes or the debt crisis itself.)
Coming at last to the 1990s, I am not persuaded that the steps taken to
deal with the Asian crisis, whatever their merits or defects, reﬂected deep
worries about the eﬀects of the crisis on the trading system. By that time, if
not earlier, the oﬃcial community was strongly committed to the integrity
of an international ﬁnancial system friendly to private capital ﬂows, as well
as the liberalization of trade in ﬁnancial services. How else can one explain
the ill-fated push for capital account convertibility on the eve of the Asian
crisis? How else can one explain the importance attached to ﬁnancial-sector
reform in the crisis-stricken countries and the ongoing attempt to foster
compliance with international codes and standards deﬁning “best practice”
in the public, ﬁnancial, and corporate sectors?
Eichengreen and James rightly observe that the commitment to an open
trading system has been an “abiding” commitment, whereas the commit-
ment to open capital markets has waxed and waned. This fact by itself, how-
ever, should not cause us to minimize the importance of the sporadic com-
mitment to open capital markets when we interpret attempts to reform the
international monetary system.
Before turning to the last part of the paper, let me draw attention to a
monetary reform—the move to European monetary union—that does sup-
port the thesis of this paper. Eichengreen and James mention it only in pass-
ing, because they limit themselves to reform of the global monetary system.
Yet the move to European monetary union was in part the consequence of
a perceived threat to the trading system. The timing of the move owes much
to the adoption of the Single European Act, which required the rapid
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posed a threat to the viability of the EMS. Padoa-Schioppa (1988) laid out
the implications. If the EMS was not replaced by a full-ﬂedged monetary
union, it would succumb eventually to an exchange rate crisis and give way
to greater exchange rate ﬂexibility within the European Community. But
large exchange rate changes would threaten the integrity of the single mar-
ket by generating pressures for covert protection—and that is what actually
happened during the EMS crisis of 1992–93 (see, e.g., Eichengreen 1996).
In short, the move to monetary union cannot be explained without citing
the threat to the trading system posed by the removal of capital controls.
In the last part of their paper, Eichengreen and James make some in-
triguing statements about the current attempt to reform the international ﬁ-
nancial system.
One of those statements pertains to the role of international standards
and codes in promoting domestic adaptation to the integration of ﬁnancial
markets. Eichengreen and James are right to point out that the scope of this
eﬀort is unprecedented, but they go on to argue that the strategy is not
new—that it is a throwback to the nineteenth century because it involves
global standardization and “insofar as the markets rather than the multi-
laterals are the ultimate arbitrators of countries’ compliance.” If that proves
to be true, however, it will be because the various standards and codes have
been poorly designed for the purpose at hand. They attempt to deﬁne “best
practice” rather than minimally acceptable practice. As a result, developing
countries have insisted that they be judged by the progress they make, not
the level of compliance they achieve, and they have thus far blocked any
attempt by the oﬃcial sector to devise and apply incentives and penalties
designed to promote compliance with the new standards and codes.1 But
markets don’t care very much about progress; they are—and should be—
interested in absolute compliance. Therefore, they are not likely to make
much sense or much use of the ongoing oﬃcial assessments of compliance,
which also emphasize progress.
The second statement pertains to the role of the IMF. “There is,” we are
told, “agreement that market-based debt restructuring should be relied on
more, ﬁnancial rescues less.” This is true but says very little. The oﬃcial
community has used similar language ever since the Mexican crisis but has
continued to engage in ﬁnancial rescues. A seemingly innocuous sentence
in a communiqué of the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Com-
mittee points to the unresolved problem. It “reaﬃrms the exceptional char-
acter of ﬁnancing beyond normal access limits, and repeats that reliance on
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1. For evidence to this eﬀect, compare two documents, the Issue Paper of the Task Force on
Implementation of Standards (Financial Stability Forum 2000a), which contains a long list of
incentives and penalties that might be employed by the oﬃcial sector, and the Report of the Fol-
low-Up Group on Incentives to Foster Implementation of Standards (Financial Stability Forum
2000b), which backs away from most of them.the catalytic approach at high levels of access must presume substantial jus-
tiﬁcation” (IMF 2001). Let me translate that from fundspeak into ordinary
English. Up to now, the committee is saying, oﬃcial ﬁnancing has been re-
garded as best way to catalyze voluntary private-sector involvement in cri-
sis resolution. If we limit oﬃcial ﬁnancing to “ordinary” levels, can we ex-
pect to catalyze that sort of involvement, or will we have to rely more heavily
on other, “concerted” ways of involving the private sector? There is, to be
sure, little enthusiasm for large-scale oﬃcial ﬁnancing, partly because of
concern about moral hazard. But there is less than full agreement on the
best way to do without it.
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